Missing Encryption of Sensitive DataID: 311 | Date: (C)2012-05-14 (M)2022-10-10 |
Type: weakness | Status: DRAFT |
Abstraction Type: Base |
Description
The software does not encrypt sensitive or critical information
before storage or transmission.
Extended DescriptionThe lack of proper data encryption passes up the guarantees of
confidentiality, integrity, and accountability that properly implemented
encryption conveys.
Likelihood of Exploit: High to Very High
Applicable PlatformsLanguage Class: Language-independent
Time Of Introduction
- Architecture and Design
- Operation
Related Attack Patterns
Common Consequences
Scope | Technical Impact | Notes |
---|
Confidentiality | Read application
data | If the application does not use a secure channel, such as SSL, to
exchange sensitive information, it is possible for an attacker with
access to the network traffic to sniff packets from the connection and
uncover the data. This attack is not technically difficult, but does
require physical access to some portion of the network over which the
sensitive data travels. This access is usually somewhere near where the
user is connected to the network (such as a colleague on the company
network) but can be anywhere along the path from the user to the end
server. |
ConfidentialityIntegrity | Modify application
data | Omitting the use of encryption in any program which transfers data
over a network of any kind should be considered on par with delivering
the data sent to each user on the local networks of both the sender and
receiver. Worse, this omission allows for the injection of data into a
stream of communication between two parties -- with no means for the
victims to separate valid data from invalid. In this day of widespread
network attacks and password collection sniffers, it is an unnecessary
risk to omit encryption from the design of any system which might
benefit from it. |
Detection Methods
Name | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
---|
Manual Analysis | The characterizaton of sensitive data often requires domain-specific
understanding, so manual methods are useful. However, manual efforts
might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Black box methods may produce artifacts (e.g. stored data or unencrypted
network transfer) that require manual evaluation. | High | |
Automated Analysis | Automated measurement of the entropy of an input/output source may
indicate the use or lack of encryption, but human analysis is still
required to distinguish intentionally-unencrypted data (e.g. metadata)
from sensitive data. | | |
Potential Mitigations
Phase | Strategy | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
---|
Requirements | | Clearly specify which data or resources are valuable enough that they
should be protected by encryption. Require that any transmission or
storage of this data/resource should use well-vetted encryption
algorithms. | | |
Architecture and Design | Threat Modeling | Using threat modeling or other techniques, assume that the data can be
compromised through a separate vulnerability or weakness, and determine
where encryption will be most effective. Ensure that data that should be
private is not being inadvertently exposed using weaknesses such as
insecure permissions (CWE-732). [R.311.1] | | |
Architecture and Design | | Ensure that encryption is properly integrated into the system design,
including but not necessarily limited to:Identify the separate needs and contexts for encryption: | | |
Architecture and Design | Libraries or Frameworks | When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong,
up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a
well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by
experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all
cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for
analysis.For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2
certification.Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will
likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers.
Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be
compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially
weak.Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete.
Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of
computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4,
MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong.
[R.311.5] | | |
Architecture and Design | Separation of Privilege | Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust
boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go
outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing
with a compartment outside of the safe area.Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system
design and that the compartmentalization serves to allow for and further
reinforce privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers
should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide when it is
appropriate to use and to drop system privileges. | | |
ImplementationArchitecture and Design | | When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut
corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are
often essential for preventing common attacks. | | |
Implementation | Identify and Reduce Attack Surface | Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when
sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or
other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as
much as possible. | Defense in Depth | This makes it easier to spot places in the code where data is being
used that is unencrypted. |
Relationships
Related CWE | Type | View | Chain |
---|
CWE-311 ChildOf CWE-895 | Category | CWE-888 | |
Demonstrative Examples (Details)
- The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to
communicate sensitive information. (Demonstrative Example Id DX-42)
- The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a
password, then store it to a buffer. (Demonstrative Example Id DX-41)
- This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user
does not have to login again later. (Demonstrative Example Id DX-40)
Observed Examples
- CVE-2009-2272 : password and username stored in cleartext in a cookie
- CVE-2009-1466 : password stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissions
- CVE-2009-0152 : chat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL.
- CVE-2009-1603 : Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryption
- CVE-2009-0964 : storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
- CVE-2008-6157 : storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
- CVE-2008-6828 : product stores a password in cleartext in memory
- CVE-2008-1567 : storage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary file
- CVE-2008-0174 : SCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encrypted
- CVE-2007-5778 : login credentials stored unencrypted in a registry key
- CVE-2002-1949 : Passwords transmitted in cleartext.
- CVE-2008-4122 : Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP.
- CVE-2008-3289 : Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy.
- CVE-2008-4390 : Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext.
- CVE-2007-5626 : Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email.
- CVE-2004-1852 : Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext.
- CVE-2008-0374 : Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext.
- CVE-2007-4961 : Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
- CVE-2007-4786 : Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server.
- CVE-2005-3140 : Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.
For more examples, refer to CVE relations in the bottom box.
White Box Definitions None
Black Box Definitions None
Taxynomy Mappings
Taxynomy | Id | Name | Fit |
---|
CLASP | | Failure to encrypt data | |
OWASP Top Ten 2007 | A8 | Insecure Cryptographic Storage | CWE_More_Specific |
OWASP Top Ten 2007 | A9 | Insecure Communications | CWE_More_Specific |
OWASP Top Ten 2004 | A8 | Insecure Storage | CWE_More_Specific |
WASC | 4 | Insufficient Transport Layer Protection | |
CERT Java Secure Coding | MSC00-J | Use SSLSocket rather than Socket for secure data
exchange | |
References:
- M. Howard D. LeBlanc .Writing Secure Code 2nd Edition. Microsoft. Section:'Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page
299'. Published on 2002.
- Michael Howard David LeBlanc John Viega .24 Deadly Sins of Software Security. McGraw-Hill. Section:'"Sin 17: Failure to Protect Stored Data." Page
253'. Published on 2010.
- Frank Kim .Top 25 Series - Rank 10 - Missing Encryption of Sensitive
Data. SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-02-26.
- Mark Dowd John McDonald Justin Schuh .The Art of Software Security Assessment 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. Section:'Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Encryption", Page
43.'. Published on 2006.
- Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology .SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MODULES. 2001-05-25.