As reported upstream:When NTP or cmdmon access was configured with a subnet size that is indivisible by 4 and an address that has nonzero bits in the 4-bit subnet remainder , the new setting was written to an incorrect location, possibly outside the allocated array. An attacker that has the command key and is allowed to access cmdmon could exploit this to crash chronyd or possibly execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the chronyd process. When allocating memory to save unacknowledged replies to authenticated command requests, the last "next" pointer was not initialized to NULL. When all allocated reply slots were used, the next reply could be written to an invalid memory instead of allocating a new slot for it. An attacker that has the command key and is allowed to access cmdmon could exploit this to crash chronyd or possibly execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the chronyd process. An attacker knowing that NTP hosts A and B are peering with each other can send a packet with random timestamps to host A with source address of B which will set the NTP state variables on A to the values sent by the attacker. Host A will then send on its next poll to B a packet with originate timestamp that doesn"t match the transmit timestamp of B and the packet will be dropped. If the attacker does this periodically for both hosts, they won"t be able to synchronize to each other. Authentication using a symmetric key can fully protect against this attack, but in implementations following the NTPv3 or NTPv4 specification the state variables were updated even when the authentication check failed and the association was not protected