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CWE
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Path Traversal: '/../filedir'

ID: 25Date: (C)2012-05-14   (M)2022-10-10
Type: weaknessStatus: INCOMPLETE
Abstraction Type: Variant





Description

The software uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize "/../" sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.

Extended Description

This allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or directories that are outside of the restricted directory.

Sometimes a program checks for "../" at the beginning of the input, so a "/../" can bypass that check.

Applicable Platforms
Language Class: All

Time Of Introduction

  • Implementation

Common Consequences

ScopeTechnical ImpactNotes
Confidentiality
Integrity
 
Read files or directories
Modify files or directories
 
 

Detection Methods
None

Potential Mitigations

PhaseStrategyDescriptionEffectivenessNotes
Implementation
 
Input Validation
 
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs (i.e., do not rely on a blacklist). A blacklist is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent whitelists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a whitelist of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a blacklist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
 
  
Implementation
 
Input Validation
 
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass whitelist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
 
  

Relationships

Related CWETypeViewChain
CWE-25 ChildOf CWE-893 Category CWE-888  

Demonstrative Examples
None

White Box Definitions
None

Black Box Definitions
None

Taxynomy Mappings

TaxynomyIdNameFit
PLOVER  '/../filedir
 
 

References:
None

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