Path Traversal: '....//'ID: 34 | Date: (C)2012-05-14 (M)2022-10-10 |
Type: weakness | Status: INCOMPLETE |
Abstraction Type: Variant |
Description
The software uses external input to construct a pathname that
should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize
'....//' (doubled dot dot slash) sequences that can resolve to a location that
is outside of that directory.
Extended DescriptionThis allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or
directories that are outside of the restricted directory.The '....//' manipulation is useful for bypassing some path traversal
protection schemes. If "../" is filtered in a sequential fashion, as done by
some regular expression engines, then "....//" can collapse into the "../"
unsafe value (CWE-182). It could also be useful when ".." is removed, if the
operating system treats "//" and "/" as equivalent.
Applicable PlatformsLanguage Class: All
Time Of Introduction
Common Consequences
Scope | Technical Impact | Notes |
---|
ConfidentialityIntegrity | Read files or
directoriesModify files or
directories | |
Detection MethodsNone
Potential Mitigations
Phase | Strategy | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
---|
Implementation | Input Validation | Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input
validation strategy, i.e., use a whitelist of acceptable inputs that
strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not
strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that
does.When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant
properties, including length, type of input, the full range of
acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across
related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of
business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only
contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is
only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs
(i.e., do not rely on a blacklist). A blacklist is likely to miss at
least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment
changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended
validation. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential
attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be
rejected outright.When validating filenames, use stringent whitelists that limit the
character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character
in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude
directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a whitelist of
allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes
potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a blacklist,
which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is
insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\"
as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the
filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data
(CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the
".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would
be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would
still form the "../" string. | | |
Implementation | Input Validation | Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's
current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make
sure that the application does not decode the same input twice
(CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass whitelist validation
schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been
checked. | | |
RelationshipsThis could occur due to a cleansing error that removes a single "../" from
"....//"
Related CWE | Type | View | Chain |
---|
CWE-34 ChildOf CWE-893 | Category | CWE-888 | |
Demonstrative ExamplesNone
Observed Examples
- CVE-2004-1670 : Mail server allows remote attackers to create arbitrary directories via a ".." or rename arbitrary files via a "....//" in user supplied parameters.
For more examples, refer to CVE relations in the bottom box.
White Box Definitions None
Black Box Definitions None
Taxynomy Mappings
Taxynomy | Id | Name | Fit |
---|
PLOVER | | '....//' (doubled dot dot slash) | |
References:None