Use of Hard-coded Credentials| ID: 798 | Date: (C)2012-05-14 (M)2022-10-10 |
| Type: weakness | Status: INCOMPLETE |
| Abstraction Type: Base |
Description
The software contains hard-coded credentials, such as a
password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication,
outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal
data.
Extended DescriptionHard-coded credentials typically create a significant hole that allows an
attacker to bypass the authentication that has been configured by the
software administrator. This hole might be difficult for the system
administrator to detect. Even if detected, it can be difficult to fix, so
the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely. There
are two main variations:Inbound: the software contains an authentication mechanism that checks
the input credentials against a hard-coded set of credentials.Outbound: the software connects to another system or component, and it
contains hard-coded credentials for connecting to that component.In the Inbound variant, a default administration account is created, and a
simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that
account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the
product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system
administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching
the software. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common
occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password
can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the software
will have the same password, even across different organizations, this
enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.The Outbound variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a
back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password which
can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end
credentials into the front-end software. Any user of that program may be
able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords
pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary
is usually very simple.
Likelihood of Exploit: Very High
Applicable PlatformsLanguage Class: Language-independent
Time Of Introduction
Related Attack Patterns
Common Consequences
| Scope | Technical Impact | Notes |
|---|
| Access_Control | Bypass protection
mechanism | If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious
users will gain access to the account in question. |
| IntegrityConfidentialityAvailabilityAccess_ControlOther | Read application
dataGain privileges / assume
identityExecute unauthorized code or
commandsOther | This weakness can lead to the exposure of resources or functionality
to unintended actors, possibly providing attackers with sensitive
information or even execute arbitrary code. |
Detection Methods
| Name | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
|---|
| Black Box | Credential storage in configuration files is findable using black box
methods, but the use of hard-coded credentials for an incoming
authentication routine typically involves an account that is not visible
outside of the code. | Moderate | |
| Automated Static Analysis | Automated white box techniques have been published for detecting
hard-coded credentials for incoming authentication, but there is some
expert disagreement regarding their effectiveness and applicability to a
broad range of methods. | | |
| Manual Static Analysis | This weakness may be detectable using manual code analysis. Unless
authentication is decentralized and applied throughout the software,
there can be sufficient time for the analyst to find incoming
authentication routines and examine the program logic looking for usage
of hard-coded credentials. Configuration files could also be
analyzed. | | |
| Manual Dynamic Analysis | For hard-coded credentials in incoming authentication: use monitoring
tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the
operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when
source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or
if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new
weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the
running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris)
and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon,
Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and
sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using call
trees or similar artifacts from the output, examine the associated
behaviors and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a
fixed string or value. | | |
Potential Mitigations
| Phase | Strategy | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
|---|
| Architecture and Design | | For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other
credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted
configuration file or database that is protected from access by all
outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly
protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the
file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible
[R.798.1].In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide
some protection. | | |
| Architecture and Design | | For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username
and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time
logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a
unique strong password or key. | | |
| Architecture and Design | | If the software must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be
removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can
access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For
example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console
instead of through a network connection. | | |
| Architecture and Design | | For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way
hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or
database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the
file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password.
When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash
of the password and compare it to the saved hash.Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated.
This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to
conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the
rainbow table method. | | |
| Architecture and Design | | For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible,
although none are complete. | | |
Relationships
| Related CWE | Type | View | Chain |
|---|
| CWE-798 ChildOf CWE-812 | Category | CWE-809 | |
Demonstrative Examples (Details)
- The following code examples attempt to verify a password using a
hard-coded cryptographic key. The cryptographic key is within a hard-coded
string value that is compared to the password and a true or false value is
returned for verification that the password is equivalent to the hard-coded
cryptographic key. (Demonstrative Example Id DX-92)
- The following code is an example of an internal hard-coded password
in the back-end: (Demonstrative Example Id DX-14)
- The following code uses a hard-coded password to connect to a
database: (Demonstrative Example Id DX-13)
- The following examples show a portion of properties and
configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include
username and password information but they are stored in
plaintext. (Demonstrative Example Id DX-43)
Observed Examples
- CVE-2010-2772 : SCADA system uses a hard-coded password to protect back-end database containing authorization information, exploited by Stuxnet worm
- CVE-2010-2073 : FTP server library uses hard-coded usernames and passwords for three default accounts
- CVE-2010-1573 : Chain: Router firmware uses hard-coded username and password for access to debug functionality, which can be used to execute arbitrary code
- CVE-2008-2369 : Server uses hard-coded authentication key
- CVE-2008-0961 : Backup product uses hard-coded username and password, allowing attackers to bypass authentication via the RPC interface
- CVE-2008-1160 : Security appliance uses hard-coded password allowing attackers to gain root access
- CVE-2006-7142 : Drive encryption product stores hard-coded cryptographic keys for encrypted configuration files in executable programs
- CVE-2005-3716 : VoIP product uses unchangeable hard-coded public credentials that cannot be changed, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information
- CVE-2005-3803 : VoIP product uses hard coded public and private SNMP community strings that cannot be changed, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information
- CVE-2005-0496 : Backup product contains hard-coded credentials that effectively serve as a back door, which allows remote attackers to access the file system
For more examples, refer to CVE relations in the bottom box.
White Box Definitions None
Black Box Definitions None
Taxynomy Mappings
| Taxynomy | Id | Name | Fit |
|---|
| CERT Java Secure Coding | MSC03-J | Never hard code sensitive information | |
References:
- M. Howard D. LeBlanc .Writing Secure Code 2nd Edition. Microsoft. Section:'Chapter 8, "Key Management Issues" Page
272'. Published on 2002.
- Johannes Ullrich .Top 25 Series - Rank 11 - Hardcoded
Credentials. SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-10.
