Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)ID: 80 | Date: (C)2012-05-14 (M)2022-10-10 |
Type: weakness | Status: INCOMPLETE |
Abstraction Type: Variant |
Description
The software receives input from an upstream component, but it
does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special characters such as
"<", ">", and "&" that could be interpreted as web-scripting elements
when they are sent to a downstream component that processes web
pages.
Extended DescriptionThis may allow such characters to be treated as control characters, which
are executed client-side in the context of the user's session. Although this
can be classified as an injection problem, the more pertinent issue is the
improper conversion of such special characters to respective
context-appropriate entities before displaying them to the user.
Likelihood of Exploit: High to Very High
Applicable PlatformsLanguage Class: All
Time Of Introduction
Related Attack Patterns
Common Consequences
Scope | Technical Impact | Notes |
---|
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability | Read application
dataExecute unauthorized code or
commands | |
Detection MethodsNone
Potential Mitigations
Phase | Strategy | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
---|
Implementation | | Carefully check each input parameter against a rigorous positive
specification (white list) defining the specific characters and format
allowed. All input should be neutralized, not just parameters that the
user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including
hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common
mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only
fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. We often
encounter data from the request that is reflected by the application
server or the application that the development team did not anticipate.
Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future
developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is
recommended. | | |
Implementation | Output Encoding | Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the
downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings
include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified,
a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by
assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is
being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent,
the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as
special, even if they are not special in the original encoding.
Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct
injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection
mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the
downstream component.The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web
pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers
often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the
browser to subtle XSS attacks. | | |
Implementation | | With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter
attribute set to true. | | |
Implementation | Identify and Reduce Attack Surface | To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set
the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly
feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox),
this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being
accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie.
This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all
browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser
technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the
Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set. | Defense in Depth | |
Relationships
Related CWE | Type | View | Chain |
---|
CWE-80 ChildOf CWE-896 | Category | CWE-888 | |
Demonstrative Examples (Details)
- In the following example, a guestbook comment isn't properly
encoded, filtered, or otherwise neutralized for script-related tags before
being displayed in a client browser.
Observed Examples
- CVE-2002-0938 : XSS in parameter in a link.
- CVE-2002-1495 : XSS in web-based email product via attachment filenames.
- CVE-2003-1136 : HTML injection in posted message.
- CVE-2004-2171 : XSS not quoted in error page.
For more examples, refer to CVE relations in the bottom box.
White Box DefinitionsA weakness where the code path has:1. start statement that accepts input from HTML page2. end statement that publishes a data item to HTML wherea. the input is part of the data item andb. the input contains XSS syntax
Black Box Definitions None
Taxynomy Mappings
Taxynomy | Id | Name | Fit |
---|
PLOVER | | Basic XSS | |
References:None