Improper Neutralization of Script in an Error Message Web PageID: 81 | Date: (C)2012-05-14 (M)2022-10-10 |
Type: weakness | Status: INCOMPLETE |
Abstraction Type: Variant |
Description
The software receives input from an upstream component, but it
does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special characters that could be
interpreted as web-scripting elements when they are sent to an error
page.
Extended DescriptionError pages may include customized 403 Forbidden or 404 Not Found
pages.When an attacker can trigger an error that contains unneutralized input,
then cross-site scripting attacks may be possible.
Applicable PlatformsLanguage Class: All
Time Of Introduction
Related Attack Patterns
Common Consequences
Scope | Technical Impact | Notes |
---|
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability | Read application
dataExecute unauthorized code or
commands | |
Detection MethodsNone
Potential Mitigations
Phase | Strategy | Description | Effectiveness | Notes |
---|
| | Do not write user-controlled input to error pages. | | |
Implementation | | Carefully check each input parameter against a rigorous positive
specification (white list) defining the specific characters and format
allowed. All input should be neutralized, not just parameters that the
user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including
hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common
mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only
fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. We often
encounter data from the request that is reflected by the application
server or the application that the development team did not anticipate.
Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future
developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is
recommended. | | |
Implementation | Output Encoding | Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the
downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings
include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified,
a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by
assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is
being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent,
the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as
special, even if they are not special in the original encoding.
Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct
injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection
mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the
downstream component.The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web
pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers
often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the
browser to subtle XSS attacks. | | |
Implementation | | With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter
attribute set to true. | | |
Implementation | Identify and Reduce Attack Surface | To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set
the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly
feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox),
this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being
accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie.
This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all
browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser
technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the
Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set. | Defense in Depth | |
Relationships
Related CWE | Type | View | Chain |
---|
CWE-81 ChildOf CWE-896 | Category | CWE-888 | |
Demonstrative ExamplesNone
Observed Examples
- CVE-2002-0840 : XSS in default error page from Host: header.
- CVE-2002-1053 : XSS in error message.
- CVE-2002-1700 : XSS in error page from targeted parameter.
For more examples, refer to CVE relations in the bottom box.
White Box Definitions None
Black Box Definitions None
Taxynomy Mappings
Taxynomy | Id | Name | Fit |
---|
PLOVER | | XSS in error pages | |
References:
- Michael Howard David LeBlanc John Viega .24 Deadly Sins of Software Security. McGraw-Hill. Section:'"Sin 11: Failure to Handle Errors Correctly." Page
183'. Published on 2010.